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Abstract. Reputation is often cited as an instrument to enforce norm
compliance: agents that do not follow the norms have their reputation
decreased. Conceiving reputation as a collective process, i.e. a kind of
shared voices as proposed by Conte & Paolucci, is not a simple task.
In this paper, we propose a first step in this direction by instrumenting
multi-agent organisation with an artifact that publishes some objective
evaluations of the performance of the agents with respect to their be-
haviour within the organisation. The members of the organisation can
then read these evaluations and build up their reputation of others. The
artifact serves thus as an instrument that aid in the building of the repu-
tation of the agents. We propose that the evaluation of the agents is not
simply based on their obedience to norms, but also considers their pro-
activeness and their contribution to the success of collective tasks that
are being executed in the organisation. This proposal is detailed and ex-
emplified in the context of the Moise+ organisational model supported
by a set of organisational artifacts as proposed in the ora4mas approach.
Keywords: organisation, artifacts, norm enforcement, reputation.
1 Introduction
The concept of multi-agent organisation is becoming widely accepted as an in-
strument for open systems not only to help the coordination of autonomous
agents but also to control their autonomy [3, 13]. For example, when someone
adopts the role of master student in a laboratory, she remains autonomous to
perform its research but should follow some rules of the laboratory organisation.
These rules vary from ‘the access to computers requires an username’ to ‘a mas-
ter thesis should be written in two years’. The agent is free to adopt the role,
but once adopted the organisation expects her autonomy to be limited.
An important feature of this approach when applied to multi-agent systems
(MAS) is the flexibility: the agents are neither completely autonomous to do
whatever they want nor completely constrained to pre-defined behaviours. The
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organisation serves as a kind of ‘tuning’ of the autonomy level. To find out a
good degree of allowed autonomy is indeed a challenge, specially in the case
where the agents have to organise the system themselves [11].
The success of this organisational approach depends on how the compliance
to the rules is ensured inside the system. An approach to deal with this issue is to
use the agent’s reputation as an instrument to enforce the compliance to organ-
isational rules. The general proposal is that the agent’s behaviour is constantly
evaluated by the organisation with respect to the roles it plays and the result of
this evaluation is published to other members (phase i). This information helps
then the agents to construct the reputation of others inside the organisation
(phase ii). Hence the reputation influences decision processes (e.g. when agents
have to select partners to cooperate with), agents take care of their reputation
and behave accordingly (phase iii). While phases ii and iii are concerned with
how the agents will use the published information, the first phase can be con-
ceived outside the agents. The main contribution of this work is to describe how
this first phase of the process can be instrumented in a multi-agent organisation
by using artifacts as proposed in ora4mas [15].
The next section presents a general analysis of the norm enforcement in
the context of organisations and the main concepts used in this paper. In the
sequence (Sec. 3), these concepts are reified on theMoise+ organisational model
on which our proposal is based both at the modelling language level and at the
organisation management level. Our proposal (to use artifacts for supporting
reputation processes in open organisations) is then detailed in Sec. 4. We finish
the paper discussing related works, specially those that consider the relation
between organisation and reputation.
2 Norms in Multi-Agent Organisations
To illustrate the concepts used in the sequence of this section, we will use the
following scenario:
Alice has recently started her master’s course in a French research lab-
oratory in computer science. As a master student she has thus several
norms to follow: write a technical report from state of the art in the
thesis’ subject; write a paper in English, code programs to experiment
ideas, be friendly with colleagues, use only computers allocated to the
master course, do not break equipments, etc. Alice also plans to continue
her studies in a PhD course in the same laboratory. She is thus concerned
about her reputation during the masters because it is normally used in
the PhD selection process.
In this scenario, we can identify several norms that limit the autonomy of
Alice and that she accepted when entered in the master course. Roughly a norm
is an obligation, permission, or interdiction to perform some action or achieve
some goal. A norm may also have a condition that states when it is active and a
deadline to be fulfilled (write a thesis in three years).1 Despite the disposition of
the agents to follow these norms or not, the organisation should have instruments
to ensure that they are followed. Before presenting these instruments, the next
subsection presents two types of mechanism to implements them.
2.1 Regimentation and enforcement
In the above scenario, we can distinguish a sort of norms that can be ensured by
the organisation itself. For example, the norm ‘use only computers allocated to
the master course’ can be ensured by user’s profiles and passwords. In this exam-
ple, the login procedure to access computers is the instrument that implements
that norm. However, norms like ‘write a paper in English’ do not need to (or
cannot) be forced by the organisation. The organisation cannot force students
to write a paper in the same way it can force them to access only authorised
computers. We are thus considering two main mechanisms to implement norm
in a MAS:2
– Regimentation is a mechanism that simply prevents the agents to perform
actions that are forbidden by a norm. More precisely, we regiment some
actions in order to preserve important features of the system (e.g. the access
to the computers).
– Enforcement is a mechanism which is applied after the detection of the
violation of some norm. While regimentation is a preventive mechanism,
enforcement is a reactive one. From the point of view of the agents, they
may decide to obey or not the norm according to their local view of the
organisation. From a system point of view, the fulfilled/unfulfilled of the
norms should be detected, evaluated as a violation or not, and then judged
as worth of sanction/reward or not.
These two mechanisms allow us to balance (i) the ensuring of very important
properties of the system by means of regimentation and, by means of enforce-
ment, (ii) the agents’ autonomy required to keep the possibility to adapt and
evolve. The norms of the MAS can be instrumented either as regimentations
or enforcement mechanisms depending on which side the designer wants to give
more weight. Briefly, regimentation should be used to fully constrain the actions
of the agents and enforcement should be used when some violation is allowed
(or even desired).
1 We are aware that the concept of norm is broader and more complex than that
used in this paper (e.g. [21] and the Deontic Logic in Computer Science workshop
series [7]). For the present paper however this simple and informal definition is
enough to discuss the proposal.
2 This classification is based on the proposal described in [9, 6]. However, we present
them in a more specific context: regimentation is applied only to the interdiction of
organisational actions and enforcement is applied to the other cases.
2.2 Norm management
In the context of platforms for MAS organisation the regimentation mechanism
is often used. Agents run on an infrastructure that ensures that all norms will
be respected, as in the case of Ameli [5] where norms are ensured by means
of governors, S-Moise+ [12] by organisational proxies, and ora4mas [15] by
organisational artifacts. For example, when an agent sends a message in the
context of a protocol execution, if the message does not follow the rules stated
by the protocol, the message is not indeed sent. The action of the agent is not
executed since it cannot violate the norm entitled by the protocol. Organisational
infrastructures normally use regimentation as an instrument to implement its
norms.
Some organisational models have however norms that cannot be implemented
by regimentation. In theMoise+ model, for example, two roles may be related
by an authority link: the agent playing the role ρ1 has to obey orders from
the agent playing the role ρ2 [13]. It is very difficult to have instruments that
regiment this norm in a MAS, specially in open systems where the internal state
of the agents is neither visible nor controllable by the organisation. Enforcement
mechanisms are thus required to implement the norms in cases like that.
The enforcement mechanism normally considers two main steps: violation
detection and sanction application. The detection of violation is certainly a hard
task in MAS and several proposals have been presented (e.g. [22]). However, as
stressed in [9] detection without sanction is worthless. The problem we identi-
fied and that motivated our work is that, as far as we know, no organisational
platform consider the sanction issue.
In this paper, we propose to instrument the organisation with an artifact
that could help in the first phase of a sanction system based on reputation, as
described in the introduction: evaluation of the behaviours of agents within an
organisation. The proposed artifact is detailed on a particular organisational
model:Moise+. The next section thus briefly describes this model based on an
example and identifies some of its norms. The section also describes how they
are managed within the ora4mas approach.
3 TheMoise+ Organisational Model and its Artifacts
TheMoise+ model proposes an organisational modelling language that explic-
itly decomposes the specification of organisation into structural, functional, and
deontic dimensions [13]. The structural dimension specifies the roles, groups, and
links of the organisation. The definition of roles states that when an agent de-
cides to play some role in a group, it is accepting some behavioural constraints
related to this role. The functional dimension specifies how the global collective
goals should be achieved, i.e. how these goals are decomposed (in global plans),
grouped in coherent sets (by missions) to be distributed to the agents. The
decomposition of global goals results in a goal-tree, called scheme, where the
leaves-goals can by achieved individually by the agents. The deontic dimension
is added in order to bind the structural dimension with the functional one by
the specification of the roles’ permissions and obligations for missions.
As an illustrative and simple example of an organisation specified using
Moise+, we consider agents that aim at writing a paper and therefore have
an organisational specification to help them to collaborate. The structure of this
organisation has only one group (wpgroup) with two roles (editor and writer)
that inherit all properties defined for the role author. The cardinalities and
links of this group are specified, using the Moise+ notation, in Fig. 1(a): the
group wpgroup can have from one to five agents playing writer and exactly one
playing editor; the editor has authority over writer and every agent playing
author (and by inheritance everyone playing writer or editor) has the pos-
sibility to communicate with every agent playing author (communication link
from author to author). In this example, the editor and the author roles are
not compatible. To be compatible, a compatibility relation must be explicitly
added in the specification.
To coordinate the achievement of the goal of writing a paper, a scheme is
defined in the functional specification of the organisation (Fig. 1(b)). In this
scheme, a draft version of the paper has to be initially defined (identified by the
goal fdv in Fig. 1(b)). This goal is decomposed into three sub-goals: write a title,
an abstract, and the section titles. Other agents then ‘fill’ the paper’s sections
to get a submission version of the paper (identified by the goal sv). The goals
of this scheme are distributed in three missions which have specific cardinalities
(cf. Fig. 1(c)): mMan for the general management of the process (one and only
one agent can commit to it), mCol for the collaboration in writing the paper’s
content (from one to five agents can commit to it), and mBib for getting the
references for the paper (one and only one agent can commit to it). A mission
defines all goals an agent commits to when participating in the execution of a
scheme, for example, commit to the mission mMan is indeed a commitment to
achieve four goals of the scheme. Goals without an assigned mission are satisfied
by the achievement of their subgoals. The deontic relation from roles to missions
is specified in Fig. 1. For example, any agent playing the role editor is permitted
to commit to the mission mMan.
The specification of an organisation is written in a suitable language, that
the agents are supposed to interpret. This language is founded on components
represented by predicates and functions. We present here only those components
that are used in the sequel of the paper. Considering an organisational specifi-
cation, G is the set of all group specifications, R is the set of all roles, S is the
set of all scheme specifications, M is the set of all missions, and Φ is the set of
all goals.
– compat(g, ρ, C): is a predicate that is true when the role ρ (ρ ∈ R) is com-
patible with all roles in the set C (C ⊆ R) when played in the group g
(g ∈ G);
– mission scheme(m, s) is a predicate that is true when the mission m (m ∈
M) belongs to the scheme s (s ∈ S);
– goal mission(ϕ,m): is a predicate that is true when the goal ϕ (ϕ ∈ Φ)
belongs to the mission m (m ∈M);
– obl(ρ,m): is a predicate that is true when the role ρ has an obligation relation
to the mission m;
– goal role(ϕ, ρ): is a predicate that is true when the role ρ is obliged to the
goal ϕ, this predicate is defined as follows
goal role(ϕ, ρ)↔ goal mission(ϕ,m) ∧ obl(ρ,m)
(a) Structural Specification (b) Functional Specification
mission cardinality
mMan 1..1
mCol 1..5
mBib 1..1
(c) Missions
role deontic relation mission
editor permitted mMan
writer obliged mCol
writer obliged mBib
(d) Deontic Specification
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of the organisational specification for the writing pa-
per example with the Moise+ OML
3.1 ORA4MAS: Managing Organisation with Organisational
Artifacts
TheMoise+ model is implemented, on one hand, by an organisational modelling
language to program declarative organisation specifications, and, on the other
hand, by organisational artifacts, as those proposed in ora4mas approach [15],
that interpret the specification and manage the organisation. The conception of
the artifacts follows the A&A (Agents and Artifacts) model [18]. In this model,
the environment is not a merely passive source of agent perceptions and target
of agent actions, but a first-class abstraction that can be suitably designed to
encapsulate some fundamental functionalities and services, supporting MAS di-
mensions such as coordination and organisation. In particular A&A introduces
a notion of artifact as first-class abstraction representing function-oriented dy-
namic entities and tools that agents can create and use to perform their individ-
ual and social activities. Thus, while agents are goal-oriented pro-active entities,
artifacts are function-oriented passive entities, designed by MAS designers to
encapsulate some kind of functionality, by representing (or wrapping existing)
resources or instruments mediating agent activities.
System
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ArtifactScheme
Artifact
Reputation
Artifact
Scheme
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Fig. 2. Agents and Organisational Artifacts.
Each artifact is mainly
composed of two interfaces:
usage and link interfaces. The
usage interface include (1) a
set of operations that agents
can trigger to get artifact ser-
vices and behaviours, and (2)
a set of observable proper-
ties that the agents can in-
spect (observe) without nec-
essarily executing operations
on it. The execution of an
operation upon an artifact
can result both in chang-
ing the artifact’s inner (i.e.
non-observable) state, and in
the generation of a stream
of observable events that can
be perceived by agents that
are using or simply observ-
ing the artifact. The link in-
terface provides operations to
another artifact enabling composed functionalities. Agents exploit artifacts func-
tionality (that is, they use artifacts) by acting on artifact usage interface which
functions as a control panel, and can be aware of artifact observable state by
observing observable properties.
As depicted in Fig. 2, agents are situated in an environment with artifacts
that they can use for different services. In the particular case of ora4mas, we are
emphasising the organisational artifacts that offer all organisational services re-
quired in an organisational management platform. There are three main types of
artifacts in the figure: group, scheme, and artifacts for the reputation processes.
The latter will be explained in the next section. Group artifacts maintains the
state of an instance of group type and offer operations related to this group. For
example, when an agent wants to adopt a role in a group, she should go to the
corresponding artifact and trigger the adoptRole operation. Similarly, a scheme
artifact offers operations related to the execution of an instance of a scheme, e.g.
commitment to missions. As observable properties, the group artifact shows the
current players of the group and the scheme shows the players and possible goals.
More precisely, from the observable properties of all organisational artifacts, we
can define the following sets, predicates, and functions:
– A: the set of all agents inside the organisation;
– plays(α, ρ, g): it is true that the agent α plays the role ρ in the group g (g
is an instance of a group in G);
– committed(α,m, s) it is true that the agent α is committed to the mission
m in the scheme s (s is an instance of a scheme in S);
– achieved(ϕ, α): it is true that the goal ϕ is already achieved by the agent α;
– possible(ϕ): it is true that the goal ϕ is possible. Possible goals are those
that are not achieved yet and that all pre-condition goals are satisfied. For
example, the goal ‘to write the conclusion of the paper’ can be achieved only
after the goal of writing sections was achieved;
– succeeded(s) it is true that the scheme s has finished successfully.
Besides providing operations and information to the agents, ora4mas arti-
facts are also responsible to (i) ensure that all regimented norms are followed by
the agents and (ii) detect the violation of norms. However they do not implement
the violation policies that conclude to sanctions (these policies are delegated to
organisational agents). All violated norms can be both displayed as observable
properties of the artifact and sent to the reputation artifact. As well as a clear
separation of concerns between agents and artifacts, the A&A approach simpli-
fies the decentralisation of the infrastructure once one artifact is loosely coupled
to others.
3.2 Moise+ norms
Based on theMoise+ specification and a platform like ora4mas that provides
runtime information of the current state of the organisation, we can write several
norms to constrain the agent’s behaviour. However it is not the focus of this paper
to present how the overall organisational specification is translated to norms.
Two examples are thus presented to illustrate the use of norms in a Moise+
based organisation. In the following these norms are represented as a pair where
the first argument is the condition part stating when the norm is active and
the second argument is the action part stating an obligation, permission, or
interdiction.
Example 1: roles are incompatible unless explicitly stated the contrary in the
specification. Thus, if it is stated that two roles ρ1 and ρ2 are compatible inside a
group g (compat(g, ρ1, {ρ2})), it implies that an agent that plays ρ1 in the group
g cannot perform the operation adoptRole(ρi, g) for any i 6= 2. This constraint
on role adoption is formalised by the following norm:
(plays(α, ρ, gb) ∧ compat(g, ρ, C),
∀ρi∈R\C forbiden(α, adoptRole(ρi, g)))
(1)
The condition of the norm (the first line) is a conjunction of predicates.
Its evaluation is given by the particular circumstance of the group (that de-
fines whether plays(α, ρ, gb) holds or not) and the structural specification being
used (that defines whether compat(g, ρ, C) holds or not). The action part of the
norm (the last line) states that it is forbidden for agent α to execute the action
adoptRole on any role that does not belong to the set of compatible roles C.
Based on this norm, as soon as an agent adopts a role (activating the norm), the
adoption of other roles that are not explicitly stated compatible are forbidden
for it.
Once this two norm is of the type ‘action interdiction’, they can be easily
implemented by regimentation: whenever the adoptRole operation is requested
by the agent α, if the condition of the norm holds, the execution of the corre-
sponding operation is denied.
Example 2: once an agent α is committed to a mission m, it is obliged to fulfil
the possible goals of the mission. The norm below specifies that rule.
(committed(α,m, s) ∧ goal mission(ϕ,m) ∧ possible(ϕ, s),
obliged(α,ϕ))
(2)
While the first norm can be easily implemented in the organisational artifacts
(adopt role(ρ, g) is an organisation action under the control of the artifact),
the implementation of this latter example is not so easy: how can we detect that
some agent is not pursuing a goal without accessing its internal state; how can
we enforce agents to follow their organisational obligations. The next section
deal with these problems.
4 Instrumenting Reputation Processes with Artifacts
The reputation is widely cited as an instrument to enforce norms [9, 8, 22, 16].
However few proposals are detailed in the context of an organisational infras-
tructure that aims to enforce its norms. Inspired by the concept of reputation
artifact proposed in [2, p. 101], this section details such artifact in the context
of the ora4mas approach. It provides first class constructs which can be easily
used to enrich the support of reputation processes.
4.1 Agent’s reputation
The new artifact that we propose to add in the system serves as an indirect
sanction instrument for norms enforcement. While direct sanctions are applied
when the violation is detected, indirect sanctions have long term results, as is
the case of reputation.
This very artifact is linked to all organisational artifacts of the ora4mas and
can be observed by all agents inside the organisation. Other artifacts notify it
about the current state of the organisation and then this information is used to
compute an evaluation for each agent inside the organisation. This evaluation is
published as an observable property of the artifact. It is important to notice that
the evaluation is not the reputation of the agent, as remarked in [2], reputation
is a shared voice circulating in a group of agents. This artifact is indeed an
instrument to influence the reputation of the agent.
Several criteria may be used to evaluate an agent inside an organisation.
Herein we choose to evaluate an agent in the context of the roles and missions
she is engaged. Three criteria are used: obedience, pro-activeness, and result.
The obedience of an agent is computed by the number of obliged goals an
agent achieves. The goals an agent is obliged to achieve are defined by norms (as
that presented in the Example 2). All obliged goals that were not yet achieved
are considered as a violation.3 The general mission obedience function (o : A →
[0, 1]) and the obedience in the context of a particular mission (om : A×M→
[0, 1]) and role (or : A ×R → [0, 1]) are calculated as follows (in the equations
# is a function that returns the size of a set):
o(α) =
#{ϕ | obliged(α,ϕ) ∧ achieved(α,ϕ)}
#{ϕ | obliged(α,ϕ)}
om(α,m) =
#{ϕ | obliged(α,ϕ) ∧ goal mission(ϕ,m) ∧ achieved(α,ϕ)}
#{ϕ | obliged(α,ϕ) ∧ goal mission(ϕ,m)}
or(α, ρ) =
#{ϕ | obliged(α,ϕ) ∧ goal role(ϕ, ρ) ∧ achieved(α,ϕ)}
#{ϕ | obliged(α,ϕ) ∧ goal role(ϕ, ρ)}
o(α) = 1 means that the agent α achieved all its obligation and o(α) = 0 means
she achieved none. om(α,m) = 1 means that the agent achieved all goals when
committed to the mission m, and or(α, ρ) = 1 means that the agent achieved all
goals when playing the role ρ.
The pro-activeness of an agent is computed by the number of goals an agent
achieves such that she is not obliged to fulfil that goal in a scheme. The general
pro-activeness function (p : A → [0, 1]) and the pro-activeness in the context of
a particular mission (pm : A ×M → [0, 1]) and role (pr : A × R → [0, 1]) are
calculated as follows:
p(α) =
#{ϕ | achieved(α,ϕ) ∧ ¬obliged(α,ϕ)}
#Φ#S
pm(α,m) =
#{ϕ | achieved(α,ϕ) ∧ ¬obliged(α,ϕ) ∧ goal mission(ϕ,m)}
#{ϕ | committed(α,m, ) ∧ goal mission(ϕ,m)}
pr(α, ρ) =
#{ϕ | achieved(α,ϕ) ∧ ¬obliged(α,ϕ) ∧ goal role(ϕ, r)}
#{ϕ | committed(α,m, ) ∧ goal mission(ϕ,m) ∧ goal role(ϕ, r)}
3 We still do not consider the temporal dimension of the obligations. For instance, once
an obliged goal is possible for an agent, it is violating the corresponding norm until
the achievement of the goal because there is not timeout assigned to the obligation.
p(α) = 1 means that the agent achieved all goals she is not obliged to (a highly
pro-active behaviour) and p(α) = 0 means the contrary.
The results of an agent is computed by the number of successful execution
of scheme where she participates. It does not depend on the achievement of the
goals in the scheme. It means the agent somehow share the success of the scheme
execution and likely has helped for the success. The general results function
(r : A → [0, 1]) and the results in the context of a particular mission (rm :
A×M→ [0, 1]) and role (rr : A×R → [0, 1]) are calculated as follows:
r(α) =
#{s | committed(α, , s) ∧ succeeded(s)}
#{s | committed(α, , s)}
rm(α,m) =
#{s | committed(α,m, s) ∧ succeeded(s)}
#{s | committed(α,m, s)}
rr(α, ρ) =
#{s | committed(α,m, s) ∧ succeeded(s) ∧ obl(ρ,m)}
#{s | committed(α,m, s) ∧ obl(ρ,m)}
r(α) = 1 means that all schemes the agent participated have finished successfully
and r(α) = 0 means the contrary.
Unlike the previous two criteria, the results value of an agent cannot be
increased by the agent itself. This evaluation depends on the performance of all
agents committed to the same scheme, creating thus a dependence among them.
The selection of good partners is therefore important and the reputation artifact
could be used for that purpose.
The aforementioned criteria are combined into a single overall evaluation of
an agent (e : A → [0, 1]) by the following weighted mean:
e(α) =
γ o(α) + δ p(α) +  r(α)
γ + δ + 
em(α,m) =
γ o(α,m) + δ p(α,m) +  r(α,m)
γ + δ + 
er(α, ρ) =
γ o(α, ρ) + δ p(α, ρ) +  r(α, ρ)
γ + δ + 
The factors γ, δ, and  are used to define the importance of the obedience,
pro-activeness, and results values respectively.
All these objective values provided by the reputation artifact can then be
used by agents to compute the reputation of others. It is possible that in one
organisation where violation is the rule, if you are a strong violator of norms,
your reputation is perhaps greater that in an organisation where violation is not
at all the rule.
4.2 Example
This subsection illustrates the evaluations performed by the reputation artifact
based on a small history of the organisation created to write papers and presented
in the second section. Three instances of the scheme were executed as shown in
Table 1, the first and third executions have finished with a paper written, but
the second has failed. In the first scheme Bob has chosen Alice as a partner
and in the second scheme the partner was Marc. Even though all goals were
achieved in the second scheme, the overall scheme failed. One possible reason is
the competence of Marc to achieve his goals. In the third scheme Bob decided to
work with both Alice and Marc. The scheme finished successfully. Note however
that Marc did not achieve the goal of compiling the references. This task was
done by Alice, even though wref was not her goal.
In the Table 2 the evaluation of the three agents are shown. Only the obli-
gation criteria is presented in all contexts (missions and roles), for the others
the general evaluation is included in the table. The values used for γ, δ, and 
are respectively 1, 5, and 2. With these parameters, pro-activeness is the more
important criteria resulting in Alice as having the best evaluation since she was
the only one that performed not obliged goals.
Scheme Agent Role Mission Achieved Goals Unachieved goals
s1 Bob editor mMan wtitle, wabs, wsectitle, wcon
Alice writer mCol wsec
Alice writer mBib wref
s2 Bob editor mMan wtitle, wabs, wsectitle, wcon
Marc writer mCol wsec
Marc writer mBib wref
s3 Bob editor mMan wtitle, wabs, wsectitle, wcon
Alice writer mCol wsec, wref
Marc writer mCol wsec
Marc writer mBib wref
Table 1. Example of an history of the organisation
Agent omMan omCol omBib oeditor owriter o p r e
Bob 12/12 – – 12/12 – 12/12 0/18 2/3 0.29
Alice – 2/2 1/1 – 3/3 3/3 1/18 2/2 0.41
Marc – 2/2 1/2 – 3/4 3/4 0/18 2/3 0.26
Table 2. Example of observable properties of the reputation artifact
5 Related Works
Some works that consider both the organisation and the reputation are con-
cerned to the problem of how an agent can use the position of another agent
in a organisation as an evaluation criteria. This approach is well illustrated in
the example cited by [4] where a police uniform gives some reputation to an
agent wearing it because of the organisation represented by the uniform. The
REGRET [19] and FIRE [14] reputation models also take this direction and
use the organisation as yet another source of information (as direct interaction
and witness) to form the reputation of a target agent. The organisation gives a
kind of ‘label’ (as an uniform or a role) to the agents. Summing up, they have
an agent centred approach and thus collective issues like norm enforcement and
sanctions are not considered.
On one hand, our proposal is complementary to the approach used in the
works cited above given an organisation centred view of the problem. Although
we do not consider how the agents build the reputation of others, we provide an
objective and detailed source of information to the agents’ reputation model. The
information published in the reputation artifact has two important features: (i)
it is not a simple label assigned to agents (‘Bob plays editor’) but an evaluation of
the performance of the agent in an organisational context (role or mission); and
(ii) it does not depend on a subjective evaluation, but is rather precisely com-
puted. On the other hand, we differ from the agent centred approach placing the
reputation artifact inside the organisation. It is supposed to be used by agents
of the organisation to chose partners and to improve the overall organisational
performance, working as norm enforcement instrument.
Another important work in the domain is presented in [10]. They also take
an agent centred approach and propose to consider the place of an agent in the
organisation in different contexts. The three levels of evaluation described in our
evaluation mechanism (general, role, mission) are inspired by their work.
In a recent work, Da Silva et al [20] proposed an approach that considers
both an agent and an organisation centred approach. Agents evaluate others
regarding the compliance of their behaviour vis-a`-vis the norms. The evaluation
and the reasons for such evaluation are then sent to the organisation. One ad-
vantage of their proposal is that the agents’ evaluations are distributed, since
they are performed by agents. This feature requires however that the system is
also concerned of the reputation of the agent as ‘evaluators’. As in our approach
the evaluation is performed by the infrastructure, we can assume the correctness
and objectiveness of the information. Another difference is that our evaluation
is not based only on norm conformity, the pro-activeness of the agents is also
taken into account.
Our approach also shares one property with traditional reputation systems
as eBay: the centralisation and publication of the information. Although the
evaluations of our proposal are published in one artifact, they are computed by
several distributed artifacts (scheme and group artifacts). Another difference is
that the evaluation is not performed by users but based on precise metrics with
a clear meaning.
Although several authors comment that reputation can be increased or de-
creased as a kind of sanction, they do not tackle the problem of how to in-
crease/decrease reputation. It is a problem specially when considering the def-
inition of reputation as proposed by [2] – reputation is something outside the
agents, but known by them. In this case, to change the reputation is neither to
simply change a value in a database nor to answer this value when requested
(serving as a witness). The public character of the value is important, and it is
achieved by our proposal of reputation artifact.
6 Conclusion and Perspectives
This paper presented work in progress that includes reputation as an instrument
to enforce norms inside organisations. Its contribution is twofold: (i) a detailed
agent evaluation process that considers the agents obedience, pro-activeness and
results in three levels (general, role, mission); and (ii) the use of artifacts as
instruments for an indirect sanction system. The inclusion of pro-activeness leads
us to a system that is not based only on obedience, as pointed out for example
by [1], sometimes the agents should break the rules. The inclusion of results
forces the agents to choose good partners in the execution of collective tasks. To
choose good partners, the reputation artifact can be used, improving thus the
importance and effect of this artifact. Although we have presented the concept
of reputation artifact in the case of ora4mas and Moise+, its application on
other infrastructures is straightforward.
As future work, we intend to study “the agents’ side” (phases ii and iii cited
in the introduction): how the information provided by the reputation artifact
can be concretely used by the reasoning mechanisms of the agents and how the
reputation of the agents are formed. We also plan to implement our proposal
in an agent programming language where artifacts are well integrated, as those
proposed in [17], and perform an evaluation in a real scenario.
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